


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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

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## IS RUSSIA ALONE TO BLAME?

THE address of Secretary of State Byrnes at the Overseas Press Club in New York on February 28, taken together with Senator Vandenberg's report of the previous day to Congress on the UNO session in London, reveals the extent to which the world has lost the mood of V-E Day, when Norman Corwin could celebrate victory over the radio "On a Note of Triumph." Six months later the note has been muted to one of mutual fear. As Mr. Byrnes said, "all around us there is suspicion and distrust, which in turn breeds suspicion and distrust." This is the miasmic climate of opinion that breeds wars.

**BIG-THREE BALANCE SHEET.** It would be easier and more bracing for us if we could squarely place the blame for the disturbed condition of the world on some one foreign country. And to an extent that is reaching the proportions of a landslide commentators and official spokesmen do tend to place the blame, openly or by implication, on Russia alone. The Soviet government, it must be admitted, has done little to dispel unfavorable opinion abroad, and some of its actions in Iran, in Manchuria, in Eastern Europe, lend themselves to the interpretation placed on them by Mr. Byrnes, Senator Vandenberg, and John Foster Dulles in his speech of March 1 before the Philadelphia branch of the Foreign Policy Association. The Russians are maintaining troops not only in their zone of Germany, but also on the soil of Germany's ex-satellites. The Russians are still in Manchuria, but say they will leave not later than U.S. troops leave China. We claim that we are in China with the consent of the Chinese, and the British offer the same justification for the maintenance of their troops in Greece.

Russia has used its military power and political influence to foster the establishment in countries along its borders in Europe, the Near and Middle East, and

Asia of governments that would conform to Moscow's idea of "friendliness." With little or no advance consultation with other countries of the Western Hemisphere, the United States has used its economic power and political influence unilaterally to bring about in Argentina a government that, unlike the Perón régime, would not constitute a threat to our interests. This policy has seemed justified to many Americans, although Britain, whose economic stake in Argentina is greater than ours, has viewed our course with disapproval and anxiety, and some Latin Americans other than the Argentines have seen in it a revival of "Yankee imperialism." The Russians have helped themselves to what Mr. Byrnes calls "alleged enemy properties" in liberated or ex-satellite countries in advance of an Allied reparations settlement. Such action is crude, and unquestionably works hardship on innocent people. But although Russia has greater war losses of economic resources to recoup than Britain, and certainly than the United States, few Westerners see anything objectionable in our policy of helping ourselves to German assets in neutral countries.

**SEEING OURSELVES AS OTHERS SEE US.** Is it possible that we may be expecting of Russia higher standards of international conduct than our own? If the atomic bomb, as some say, has made the possession of strategic bases obsolete, Russia (which is barred from sharing our atomic secret) has therefore little reason to claim bases in the eastern Mediterranean or Manchuria. But then why is it that we seek bases in Iceland and Greenland (which might seem rather menacing when seen from Russia's northern regions), and are reluctant to place under trusteeship the Pacific bases we took from Japan? Why do we not urge Britain to give up bases presumably made obsolete at Gibraltar, Malta, Sin-

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gapore? If we feel that the Russians are selfish and short-sighted in seeking to establish 'spheres of exclusive economic influence in Eastern Europe and Manchuria, why do we not prove ourselves unselfish and far-sighted by extending a loan to Britain without further tergiversation (or even making a free gift, as former Ambassador Kennedy has suggested)? Why do we not give generous economic aid to countries which are outside Russia's orbit? Why do we not reduce our tariffs so that our creditors can repay our loans by selling goods to us? If we are as worried as some of our commentators say we should be about Russia's superior manpower and its capacity to catch up by 1970 with our industrial development of the 1940's, why do we not open our borders wide to the thousands of skilled men and women who would like nothing better than to work here and help to expand our industrial production, which owes so much in the first place to the imagination, endurance, and talents of generations of immigrants?

**POSITIVE ACTIONS NEEDED.** Mr. Byrnes has said that our diplomacy must not be "negative and inert"; that "it must be marked by creative ideas, constructive proposals, practical and forward-looking suggestions." We should applaud his views. But, above all, we should stop talking about a positive policy, and start being positive.

For if we are really honest with ourselves, we cannot escape the conclusion that since V-J Day our economic withdrawal, our naked materialism as exemplified by our attitude toward the feeding of starving peoples, our political vacillations and, above all, our moral negativism, have done more to keep the world in turmoil than Russia's actions. Mr. Byrnes said that "it is not in our tradition to defend the dead hand of reaction or the tyranny of privilege." Yet we have until now tolerated just such conditions in Spain, even after the disappearance of the last vestiges of security considerations which dur-

ing the war could be held to justify this policy. No responsible person would deny the existence of dictatorship in Russia. And it is understandable that the Vatican, now as much alarmed by Moscow's aggressive support of the Russian Orthodox Church as it once was by the anti-religious campaign of Soviet leaders, should denounce the "totalitarianism" of Russia. But it is disturbing that American churchmen, amid the pomp and circumstance of ceremonies in Rome, should appear to associate themselves with pronouncements of the Vatican which, judging from the Pope's Christmas allocution, are directed not only against totalitarianism but against the liberal tradition and what Pius XII calls "secularism."

It would be unjust to say, as many disillusioned people are saying in Europe and Asia, that the United States has become a bulwark of conservatism in a world that is in the throes of one of the most far-reaching upheavals in human history. But actions speak louder than words. The war brought to the forefront in all conquered countries men and women of signal courage, penetrating vision, and ardent loyalty to the ideals of freedom and justice. These people who, if what Mr. Byrnes says is true, should have had first claim to our sympathy and support have instead found themselves cold-shouldered by many of our official representatives, who tend to associate even now with reactionary elements among outworn aristocrats and monarchists, and with the least forward-looking of churchmen. Our failure to sense the temper of Europe, to lend a hand in what seemed, at the end of the war, a promising renaissance of revitalized democracy, has given comfort to our enemies, and has disheartened our friends. Mr. Dulles is right. The United States has "very few real friends in the world today"—not because Russia has won them away from us, but because through indecision and insensitiveness we have done our best to lose them.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## FRANCO CHALLENGED BY 3-POWER DECLARATION

With the release on March 4 of the joint American-French-British note calling upon the Spanish people to force Generalissimo Franco out of power, the United States and Britain assured France of their support on an issue that has long been of particular concern to the French. In support of the three powers' assertion that Franco had given wartime aid to Hitler and Mussolini and patterned his government on theirs, the State Department published fifteen captured German, Italian and Spanish documents that revealed the Spanish dictator's role as a non-belligerent Axis partner. The joint note further declared that the three signatories did not intend any direct intervention in Spain's internal affairs, but expressed the hope that Franco might be replaced by a "caretaker" régime that would receive full diplo-

matic and economic support from abroad.

To the French the course of events in Spain during the past decade has been a source of alarm for both strategic and ideological reasons. From a strategic point of view, an unfriendly government south of the Pyrenees is only somewhat less disturbing to France than a militaristic Germany across the Rhine. Now that Germany has been defeated and France is no longer surrounded by enemies, the French government feels that the moment has arrived to improve the situation along the country's southern frontier.

From an ideological point of view France has equally strong reasons to act against Franco. Most Frenchmen who supported the resistance movement during the German occupation regard Franco as th-

ally of those French Fascists who collaborated with the Vichy régime. Although Franco charges that the French Communists alone oppose him, all three main political parties in France—the Socialists and the Popular Republican Movement (MRP), as well as the Communists—have repeatedly gone on record in favor of action that would insure his fall.

#### GARCIA INCIDENT PRECIPITATES CRISIS.

Despite this popular pressure, Foreign Minister Georges Bidault has been reluctant to take unilateral action against the Franco government for fear that France might be forced, unaided, to meet a possible attack by Spain. Accordingly, M. Bidault invited the United States and Britain early in December to indicate their attitude toward severance of diplomatic relations with Franco. When Washington made no direct answer to this query but merely said it would participate in a conference on the subject, the next move was clearly up to France. There the matter might have been allowed to rest if the Franco government had not arrested and shot, on February 21, Cristino García and nine other Spanish Republican sympathizers who had fought in the French resistance forces and, following the end of the war, resumed their underground activities in Spain. When Madrid ignored protests from Paris against this treatment of men who had shared in the struggle against the Germans, powerful workers' organizations in France threatened to tie up all transportation to the southern frontier and thus forced the government to take new steps against the Spanish régime. On February 26 M. Bidault ordered the Pyrenees frontier closed. Two days later he sent identical notes to the United States, Britain and Russia asking them to join in urging the UNO Security Council to take up the question of breaking off all diplomatic and economic relations with Spain as long as Franco remained in power.

Meanwhile, the State Department held the view that, bad as Franco was, his removal might lead only to renewal of bloody civil war in Spain among rival political groups ranging from Communists to monarchists. While, therefore, the United States joined in the anti-Franco statement made by the Big Three at the Potsdam Conference last July and the United Nations' formal refusal to permit Franco's government to join the UNO, American statements on Spain remained relatively mild and ineffective. During the past three months, however, the State Department has been consulting with Spanish Republican leaders—which it had not done previously—

and, by proposing the three-power anti-Franco declaration of March 4, it took a step that narrowed the gap between American and French policy toward Spain.

**U.S. LIMITS ECONOMIC AID.** But no degree of cooperation between the United States and France on an important diplomatic question can obscure the fact that the French are now looking without success to the United States for urgently needed economic support. Since the end of the war American credit to France has been limited to the \$550,000,000-loan from the Export-Import Bank negotiated last September, which was designed to cover only the costs of surplus property and lend-lease materials ordered before V-J Day. The provision of an adequate amount of dollar exchange to assist France during the next few years, before it is able to produce enough exports to pay for essential imports, remains to be negotiated.

It is for the purpose of discussing such a loan for approximately \$2,500,000,000 that the French have considered sending Léon Blum to Washington as special envoy. Unfortunately for the Blum mission, however, the prospects for a large American loan to France are far from bright. The gist of the Report by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, transmitted to Congress by President Truman on March 1, is that there should be no more large loan agreements such as the proposed loan to Britain. Hereafter, according to the Report's recommendations, nations seeking loans should address appeals exclusively to the Export-Import Bank. Since the total capital of this bank is \$3,500,000,000 — \$1,560,000,000 of which had already been expended by the end of 1945 — any individual loans from this source will necessarily be relatively small. A small loan, however, will not enable France to procure the fuel, raw materials and food needed to prime its disrupted industrial machine and cope with the inflation that is now sweeping the country. Yet restoration of French industry to maximum efficiency is clearly an objective that should be fostered by the United States. For if this country is to give effective aid to the democratic elements in Western Europe, it is not enough for Washington to advocate the removal of men like Franco. It must also give substantial economic assistance to moderate political elements, such as the Socialists and the MRP, which are now seeking to stabilize France.


WINIFRED N. HADSEL

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# Washington News Letter



## NARROW NATIONALISM DOMINATES CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES

Since the end of World War II many officials and members of Congress, as well as rank-and-file citizens, have disclosed a strong tendency toward isolationism in their thinking about international food, loan and immigration problems. This tendency explains in part why the Administration has been unable to implement the post-war foreign policy of the United States consistently and vigorously. While the nation in general understands that America is a world power, with responsibilities which reach far beyond its shores or vaguely defined zones of immediate security, we are still groping for methods of positive action abroad.

**ISOLATIONISM STILL POWERFUL.** The post-war isolationists hold that the United States has a choice of helping the world or helping itself, and that its best chance of surviving is to help itself. Such a view accounted for the decision by Secretary of Agriculture Clinton B. Anderson last September to do away with most of the ration controls on food, with the result that the United States could not send much food abroad. The meeting of the Famine Emergency Committee in Washington on March 1, summoned by President Truman, and headed by former President Herbert Hoover, represented a change in the September policy. For the Committee appealed to Americans to reduce their bread consumption "so that millions [abroad] may survive who are otherwise doomed to death by starvation."

Some of the arguments against the proposed Treasury loan to Britain reflect the isolationist thought that our own prosperity is unrelated to economic conditions abroad. "If we have \$4,000,000,000 to give away, let us turn our attention to the United States, where we have some very difficult problems," Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat of Montana, said on February 16 in stating his reasons for opposing the loan. Others fear that the British loan may prove a precedent for extending additional credit to many other countries. A somewhat similar attitude caused a majority of the members of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to vote in favor of hearings, beginning February 21, on the bill sponsored by Representative Ed Gossett, Democrat of Texas, which would reduce the 1924 immigration quotas by one-half for a period of 10 years. Other bills on the Committee calendar would suspend immigration altogether until unemployment, including that of war veterans, has dropped below

1,000,000, in one instance, or 100,000, in another. Present United States quotas permit the entry of 154,000 immigrants a year if every country fills its individual quota.

The legislative history of the Gossett bill suggests that isolationism is increasing rather than diminishing. The Committee on November 27, 1945 submitted to the House of Representatives a report saying: "No widespread popular demand exists for immediate drastic changes in the existing law of immigration." President Truman, hoping to expedite the movement of displaced persons from Europe, on December 22 urged that "no such legislation" as the Gossett and other bills be passed. But after hearings opened on the Gossett bill, the same Immigration Committee voted to withdraw from the House calendar the report submitted in November. An objection in the House prevented the withdrawal, so that if the Committee recommends passage of the Gossett bill, legislators will be faced with contradictory propositions. Support for immigration restriction comes chiefly from long-established veterans' organizations. The authors of the restricting bills are southerners—Gossett of Texas, A. Leonard Allen of Louisiana, Stephen Pace of Georgia, O. C. Fisher of Texas, and John E. Rankin of Mississippi—but opposition to the measure has been voiced in the South by the Archbishop of New Orleans and others.

**PROBLEM OF REFUGEES.** The pursuit of isolationist policies would lessen our influence over the course of world affairs and, especially in the case of immigration, would make it impossible for us to help solve the problem of Jewish refugees abroad, which has aroused widespread American concern and interest. The United States has steadfastly advised Britain to open up Palestine to these refugees, and participated with the British government in the establishment of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, which has been holding hearings in Washington, London, Cairo and Jerusalem. This Committee may find that the Jews in Europe need and deserve some non-European sanctuary. Our occupation policy in Germany is also complicated by the presence of displaced persons from Eastern Europe who are unwilling to return to their native lands. Yet the United States remains unwilling to provide new homes for Jewish and other European refugees within its own borders.

BLAIR BOLLES